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Comments by Charlie Bean on Barry Eichengreen’s paper at NBER Conference on Globalisation in 
an Age of Crisis, 15-16 September 2011 
 
First let me say how much I enjoyed reading Barry’s paper on the history of international economic policy 
co-ordination, spanning more than 150 years of trying and – rather more often than not – failing. Barry’s 
knowledge of this territory is unparalleled amongst economic historians and the broad historical sweep is 
masterly, as we have come to expect from him. 
  
I cannot claim to be an expert in this field, still less to have been on the scene at most of the attempts at co-
ordination that he discusses, so I do not propose to critique his portrayal of each and every episode. Instead, 
as someone presently engaged in contemporary efforts to co-ordinate policies in a number of fora, I thought 
I should offer a perspective on those efforts in the light of Barry's analysis.  By way of explanation, I should 
perhaps explain that one of my responsibilities as Deputy Governor is to represent the Bank at various 
international meetings, including G7, G20 and EcoFin, either as the Bank’s nominated Deputy or sometimes 
in the place of the Governor; I should perhaps also explain that it is the Deputies who do most of the grunt 
work leading up to meetings of G7 and G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. 
  
Barry lists four factors that he believes facilitate co-ordination.  They are: if the subject matter is technical; if 
co-ordination is institutionalised; if it helps to preserve an existing regime; and if the players share a broad 
comity. I broadly agree with this list and will illustrate their role in different aspects of recent experience.  
But I shall have some additional factors to add as well. In particular, strong personal links and trust between 
the participants is extremely valuable when seeking a co-ordinated response. And difficult or unthinkable 
decisions become feasible when the situation becomes critical: as Samuel Johnson observed, nothing focuses 
the mind like a hanging.  
 
Let me start with the G20 process. I label it as a process deliberately, because I think it is right to see it as 
one of on-going development, rather than a series of isolated meetings, which is how the press often portray 
it.  Although the G20 first met in 1999, I think it is fair to say that, prior to the crisis, attention was still 
focussed on the G7 as the premier forum for economic policy co-ordination, despite the absence of China 
and other key emerging economies. But the G20 came into its own after the collapse of Lehman’s, when the 
seizure in financial markets prompted a broad, sharp and synchronised slowdown across the global 
economy. The G20 has been at the centre of international policy co-ordination efforts since. 
 
Broadly speaking, one can identify three distinct workstreams within the G20 process over the past three 
years, directed at both crisis management and crisis prevention.  They are respectively: the macroeconomic 2 
policy response; the expansion of IMF lending capacity, refinement of its lending facilities, and 
improvements in its governance; and a thorough re-casting of financial regulation. 
 
Starting with macroeconomic policies, the appropriate stance of economic policies in early 2009 was 
reasonably clear. With the threat of a serious and sustained global slump, expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies were the order of the day across the membership, almost without exception. It was consequently not 
to too difficult for participants at the G20 meetings in London that Spring to adopt a generally expansionary 
fiscal stance. 
 
Matters have become more contentious since. As we all know, the crisis took place against the background 
of unsustainable current account imbalances, in which capital flowed 'uphill' from the emerging economies, 
especially China, into the United States and some other advanced economies. On one interpretation, these 
were the result of mercantilist policies in China aimed at facilitating rapid development, coupled with 
underdeveloped domestic financial markets that encouraged excessive saving. On another interpretation, the 
imbalances reflected excessively expansionary policies in the United States, which exploited the 'exorbitant 
privilege' of being able to borrow large amounts in its own currency. Either way, the imbalances provided 
the fuel for the excessive expansion in credit in the United States and other advanced economies that 
preceded the crisis. 
 
Correcting those imbalances, as well as identifying the appropriate rate of fiscal consolidation in different 
countries, raises difficult questions about who bears the burden of adjustment. It is much easier to agree co-
ordinated actions when all are pulling in the same direction and all stand to gain, than when there is pain to 
be shared out. Standard economic analysis of policy externalities and the gains from co-operation do not 
suggest a distinction, but regret theory suggests that losses may matter more than gains of an equivalent 
absolute magnitude. 
 
The G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, and the associated Mutual Assessment 
Process, is an attempt to make progress on this issue, where the earlier IMF-led Multilateral Consultation 
Process in 2006 failed. It has the advantage of taking place after a major crisis that nobody wants to repeat, 
which has raised members’ commitment to the process. But it is also subtly different from the earlier IMF-
led process in that it is owned by the G20 members, with the IMF merely acting as a facilitator. Peer 
pressure is supposed to be the mechanism to encourage compliance. 
 
Nevertheless, progress in rebalancing has so far been distinctly limited, with discussions bogged down in 
rather pointless technical details for much of the past year. There is general agreement on the broad direction 
of travel, but divergent views of the appropriate speed and distribution of adjustment. 3 
 
All this helps to illustrate the difficulty of agreeing a satisfactory distribution of the burden of adjustment 
between surplus and deficit countries, a problem that recurs time and again in history, as Barry documents so 
clearly. In passing, I might also note that it is central to the resolution of the euro area's present sovereign 
debt problems. My own view is a satisfactory outcome requires a surplus country to be able to see itself 
becoming a deficit country in the not-too-distant future – in effect replicating a Rawlsian state of primeval 
ignorance about their economic position.  
 
Progress on issues associated with the International Monetary System in the G20 has been somewhat mixed. 
In a crisis setting, it proved relatively easy to agree to an expansion of the Fund's resources – though it has 
taken rather longer to enact. And there have been useful changes to the Fund's lending armoury, with the 
development of the Flexible and Precautionary Credit Lines, which focus on crisis prevention rather than 
crisis management. But there has been less progress in addressing the more fundamental flaws in the 
International Monetary System associated with the asymmetry of the burden of adjustment. Much effort has 
instead been expended on negotiating a relatively modest change in quota shares, the archetypal zero-sum 
game. 
 
The G20 has, in my view, been at its most effective in progressing the reform of financial regulation. In 
accordance with the first of Barry's principles, that is because the task has been devolved to the Financial 
Stability Board, the Basle Committee and similar technical bodies. But I do not believe that progress in 
agreeing new capital standards and the like would have been as swift without the political direction given by 
the G20 and the setting of attendant deadlines, often associated with future Leaders' Summits. That has acted 
as a commitment device for the technicians and limited the amount of haggling in favour of national 
interests. 
 
At the end of his paper, Barry is somewhat critical of the issues that have been left unaddressed, such as the 
cross-border resolution of failing financial institutions, and the regulation of shadow banking. I think this is 
to miss the progressive nature of the reform agenda. The G20 have been careful not to over-burden the FSB, 
BCBS, etc., with an excessive workload that lacks effective deadlines. Instead, they have prioritised two or 
three things to be the focus of each year's work. As it happens, issues such as cross-border resolution and 
shadow banking, though technically difficult to deal with, are indeed on the current work programme at the 
behest of the G20. Whatever one may think of the regulatory proposals themselves, the process followed 
since the crisis seems to me to have been remarkably effective.       
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While the G20 may have moved to centre stage as a result of the Great Contraction, there is an important 
omission in Barry’s narrative regarding the role of the G7 in the immediate response to the financial collapse 
precipitated by Lehman’s demise three years ago today.   
 
To begin with, in late September and early October 2008, the G7 central banks, together with the Swiss 
National Bank, made several announcements of co-ordinated expansions in liquidity provision.  Then, on 
Wednesday, 8 October, together with the Swedish Riksbank, these central banks announced a simultaneous 
reduction in their policy rates of 0.5%. Alongside the announcement of extra liquidity provision, this 
provides a good example of the speed with which central banks can implement co-ordinated actions when 
circumstances require. Such actions are underpinned both by the strong institutional connections between 
central banks, particularly through the regular bi-monthly meetings of Governors and senior bank officials 
under the auspices of the BIS, and by the strong personal bonds forged there and in similar fora.  
 
Two days later, on 10 October, there was an even more notable intervention by G7 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors as a result of a meeting that took place in the margins of the IMF annual 
convocation in Washington. In my view, this was one of the most significant meetings ever of the G7. 
 
At that meeting, G7 principals threw away a vapid draft communiqué produced earlier by their Deputies 
and, working off a blueprint provided by Chairman Bernanke and prompted by some of the actions 
announced in the United Kingdom earlier that week, announced in a terse statement, a five-point plan to 
stabilise the situation. That plan comprised: a pledge to prevent further failures of systemically important 
banks; continued abundant liquidity provision by central banks; recapitalisation of banking systems, if 
necessary by the taxpayer; strengthening of depositor protection; and increased transparency of bank losses. 
Not only did they announce such a plan, they also implemented it in the following days and weeks. Those 
actions played a central role in preventing a collapse of the financial system.  But the crisis and the closeness 
of the participants helped to make it possible. 
 
In conclusion, I want to make a rather obvious point that connects with the last of Barry's four principles. 
Co-ordination is easier in smaller groups, with relatively strong mutual understanding and trust, together 
with shared interests. At G7 meetings, there are only around 20 people round the table. The G20, though 
more representative, lacks the same degree of homogeneity of interest. And in a typical G20 meeting, there 
are more than 60 people round the table, with the same again sitting behind them. This is not the sort of 
environment that encourages frank interchange and decisive decision-making. As a consequence, 
maintaining the G20's new-found status as the premier forum for economic co-operation once the crisis 
recedes into history is likely to be a challenge.   
 